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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Brandon Briggs appeals from his convictions for five counts of lewd 
conduct with a child, four counts of sexual abuse of a minor, and one count of 
enticing a child over the internet.  On appeal he claims, for the first time, that he 
was constitutionally entitled to present evidence that the minor victims were 
sexually active. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Briggs with five counts of lewd conduct with a child and 
one count of sexual abuse of a minor for engaging in sexual acts with D.S., J.S., 
and J.M. who were, at the time of the acts, in their early to mid-teens. 
(R., pp. 56-59.)  In a different case, the state charged Briggs with three counts of 
sexual abuse of a minor and one count of enticing a child over the internet for 
actions relating to D.S.  (R., pp. 334-36.)  The district court ordered the cases 
consolidated.  (R., pp. 2, 390; see also R., p. 300.) 
 Prior to trial Briggs filed a motion in limine under I.R.E. 412 seeking, 
relevant to this appeal, to introduce evidence that D.S., J.S. and J.M. had 
engaged in sexual acts with several other individuals.  (R., pp. 155-57.)  
Specifically, Briggs contended that the evidence would show that the three minor 
victims would testify that they had “sexual contact” with several other persons, 
including that “they watched dirty movies together, that they jacked each other 
off, engaged in mutual masturbation and sexual intercourse.”  (Tr., p. 48, L. 11 – 
p. 49, L. 21.)  The prosecution objected, in part, because there had been no 
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showing that the evidence was relevant.  (Tr., p. 51, L. 20 – p. 52, L. 10.)  The 
defense theory of admissibility was that the other sexual activity was 
contemporaneous with the sexual activity involving Briggs because they both 
occurred in the same two-year period.  (Tr., p. 52, L. 11 – p. 53, L. 1.)  The 
district court held that the evidence had not been shown to be relevant. 
(Tr., p. 54, L. 5 – p. 55, L. 22; R., pp. 265, 394.)   
 Following trial the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts.  (R., pp. 270-
72, 399-400.)  Briggs timely appealed from the entry of the judgments. 
(R., pp. 274-77, 287-89, 409-12, 422-24, 435-38.) 
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ISSUE 
 
 Briggs states the issue on appeal as: 
 Did the district court violate Mr. Briggs’ constitutional right to 
confront witnesses by preventing him from cross-examining the 
alleged victims on statements they made to him about their sexual 
contact with the persons identified in the Ruth Clark home? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Briggs failed to show fundamental error in the district court’s holding 
that irrelevant evidence was inadmissible? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
Briggs Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Exclusion Of Irrelevant 
Evidence 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Briggs proffered evidence that the three minor victims in the case had 
engaged in sexual conduct with multiple other persons.  (R., pp. 155-57; Tr., 
p. 48, L. 11 – p. 49, L. 21.)  When asked how the evidence was relevant he 
responded that it was relevant because the other sexual activity occurred in the 
same two-year time-frame as the charges.  (Tr., p. 52, L. 11 – p. 53, L. 1.)  The 
district court concluded the evidence was not relevant and excluded it under 
I.R.E. 412.  (Tr., p. 54, L. 5 – p. 55, L. 22; R., pp. 265, 394.) 
 For the first time on appeal, Briggs claims that he had a constitutional right 
to present the evidence of the victims’ sexual activities with others, and therefore 
exclusion of the evidence was fundamental error.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-17.)  
Specifically, Briggs contends the evidence tends to show that “the alleged [sic] 
victims had a motive to lie as a result of their desire to cover up sexual contact 
going on between the alleged victims and the persons identified in the Ruth Clark 
home.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.)  Because disclosing Briggs’ sexual abuse did 
not “cover up” different sexual activity engaged in by the victims, Briggs’ 
argument that the other sexual activity provided motive to fabricate the testimony 
against him does not withstand scrutiny. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “[A]ll claims of unobjected-to error in criminal cases are now subject to the 
fundamental error test set forth in [State v.] Perry,” 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 
(2010).  State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 173, 307 P.3d 187, 190 (2013).  To show 
fundamental error, Briggs has the burden of establishing that the error he alleges 
“(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists 
(without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate 
record . . .), and (3) was not harmless.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 
980.   
 
C. Briggs Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error 
 
 Review shows Briggs’ claim of fundamental error fails on all three prongs 
of the relevant standard. 
 Briggs has shown no violation of unwaived constitutional rights. A 
defendant in a criminal case has a Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination 
and to present a defense.  Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315–16 (1974); 
Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991); State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 
814, 839 P.2d 1223, 1228 (Ct. App. 1992).  There is no constitutional right, 
however, to present irrelevant evidence.  State v. Ozuna, 155 Idaho 697, 702–
03, 316 P.3d 109, 114–15 (Ct. App. 2013); Peite, 122 Idaho at 814, 839 P.2d at 
1228.  Furthermore, the state has a legitimate interest in protecting rape victims 
against unwarranted invasions of privacy and harassment regarding their sexual 
conduct.  Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149–50; Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 
679 (1986).  “Accordingly, trial judges retain wide discretion under the 
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Confrontation Clause to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination and 
introduction of evidence based on concerns about—among other things—
harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, witness safety, or interrogation 
that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”  Ozuna, 155 Idaho at 702–03, 316 
P.3d at 114–15 (citing Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679).  “Admission of evidence of 
an alleged victim’s past sexual behavior is constitutionally required only in 
extraordinary circumstances.”  Ozuna, 155 Idaho at 702, 316 P.3d at 114 (citing 
Peite, 122 Idaho at 815, 839 P.2d at 1229). 
 Briggs’ first argument is that not allowing cross-examination regarding the 
victims’ sexual contact with other persons violated his right to cross-examine 
“[l]ike in Van Arsdall, [475 U.S. at 679].”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.)  While Van 
Arsdall certainly stands for the general constitutional right to cross-examine 
witnesses about bias, the facts of that case were that the trial court refused to 
allow Van Arsdall to cross-examine a prosecution witness regarding dismissed 
charges.  Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 676-76.  Although the relevance toward bias 
of evidence that a state’s witness has had charges dismissed is self-evident, the 
relevance toward bias of the victims’ sexual history is not.  This case is not “like” 
Van Arsdall in any meaningful way. 
 Briggs next argues this case “presents parallels with Olden v. Kentucky, 
488 U.S. 227 (1988) (per curiam).”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-14.)  In that case: 
Petitioner’s theory of the case was that [the victim] concocted the 
rape story to protect her relationship with [her paramour], who 
would have grown suspicious upon seeing her disembark from [an 
accomplice’s] car. In order to demonstrate [the victim’s] motive to 
lie, it was crucial, petitioner contended, that he be allowed to 
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introduce evidence of [the victim’s] and [her paramour’s] current 
cohabitation. 
   
Olden, 488 U.S. at 230.  The Court commented: “In the instant case, petitioner 
has consistently asserted that he and [the victim] engaged in consensual sexual 
acts and that [the victim]—out of fear of jeopardizing her relationship with [her 
paramour]—lied when she told [her paramour] she had been raped and has 
continued to lie since.”  Id. at 232.  The lower court recognized that the 
impeachment evidence that the victim and the paramour were living together was 
relevant to petitioner’s theory of consent, but excluded the impeachment 
evidence on the basis that revealing the inter-racial relationship between the 
victim and her paramour would be prejudicial to the state.  Id.  This exclusion 
violated Olden’s constitutional right to present a defense.  Id. 
 The “parallels” between this case and Olden are neither apparent nor 
articulated by Briggs.  The defense in Olden was consent but, as noted by the 
district court, even if the proffered evidence showed consent, consent was 
irrelevant in this case.  (Tr., p. 54, L. 19 – p. 55, L. 5.)  Likewise, the reason to 
keep the victims’ sexual history from being dragged through court in this case 
was far more legitimate than refusing to expose the fact of an inter-racial and 
extra-marital sexual relationship.    
Briggs contends that the evidence showed the allegations against him 
were motivated by a desire to “cover up sexual contact” with the other people 
and “[i]t may be argued that the lies were born out of the alleged [sic] victims’ fear 
of jeopardizing their relationships” with others.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-15.)  
Even if such an argument is possible on some theoretical level, no actual 
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argument showing relevance is made by Briggs, much less shown on the record.  
Briggs has not articulated, and the record does not show, how evidence that the 
victims engaged in sexual conduct with others tended to show they did not have 
sexual contact with Briggs or that they had a motive to falsely claim they did. 
Because the proposed evidence was irrelevant, there was no constitutional right 
to present it.1 
 Briggs has failed to show error that plainly exists without the need for any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record.  The proffered 
evidence was that the three minor victims “had sexual contact” with persons 
other than the defendant “at or near the time of the allegations made in this 
case.”  (R., pp. 155-57; see also Tr., p. 48, L. 11 – p. 49, L. 21.)  There is nothing 
in this record showing even a possible connection between that evidence and 
motive to lie about Briggs having sexual contact with the three minors in this 
case.  The claim of error is not clear on this record. 
 Briggs has failed to show the error was not harmless.  Briggs argues that 
because the victims’ testimony was crucial to the state’s case, any error in 
excluding the evidence was necessarily prejudicial.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-17.)  
However, Briggs bears “the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility 
that the error affected the outcome of the trial.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 
245 P.3d at 978.  Even though the victims’ testimony was undoubtedly important, 
Briggs has failed to show why the jury would have doubted it had they heard the 
                                            
1 Alternatively, even if the evidence could be considered relevant, its probative 
value would be so slight that exclusion under the balancing test against potential 
prejudice was proper.  I.R.E. 412(c)(3). 
 9 
 
evidence in question.  As shown above, the evidence in question had no 
impeachment value and there is no reason to believe the jury would have 
concluded the victims were less believable based on the evidence set forth in 
Briggs’ motion.  
 Briggs has failed to show fundamental error because his argument fails on 
all three prongs of the fundamental error test. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgments of 
conviction. 
 DATED this 29th day of March, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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